“No matter how the international situation changes, we will continue to resolutely support Kazakhstan in protecting its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity,” Chinese President Xi Jinping told a press conference in Kazakhstan’s capital, Astana, in September.
This was clearly a message to Russia, in the context of the Ukraine invasion. A similar sentiment was expressed by Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev at the 77th session of the UN General Assembly in mid-September, when he said: “We must rethink the linkages between three primordial principles: the sovereign equality of states, the territorial integrity of states, and peaceful coexistence between states.”
An apparent pivot by Kazakhstan, away from Russia and towards China, is the latest evolution in the long and troubled history shared by Astana and Moscow. Relations between the two were made inevitable by geography, as Kazakhstan and Russia share the world’s longest contiguous land border.
Imperial Russia was always dramatically larger, wealthier and more developed than Kazakhstan, which it felt it should control. During the late 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries, Britain and Russia played out the Great Game for influence in Central Asia, including Kazakhstan. In 1735, Russian was first introduced as the language of instruction in Kazakh schools. And right up until the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian held a higher status as a language of education and commerce, causing the diminution of the Kazakh language and culture.
Ethnic Russian settlers
After the 1890s, the Trans-Aral Railway was completed and a growing number of ethnic Russians settled on Kazakh territory. The country experienced various forms of autonomy and semi-autonomy, with violent uprisings, as Kazakhstan struggled to reduce Russia’s control. Shortly after the Bolshevik victory in Russia, Kazakhstan became part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. In 1925, the country was renamed the Kazakh Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic.
Kazakhstan gained independence in 1991, after the end of the Soviet Union, and the office of president was established. Nursultan Nazarbayev went on to serve as the first and only president of Kazakhstan right through to 2019, when he resigned to install his chosen successor, Tokayev.
In 2014, Nazarbayev supported Putin’s annexation of Crimea, abstaining from the vote of condemnation in the UN. The relationship with Moscow did not run smoothly, however. A point of contention between the two countries was the customs union that flooded Kazakhstan with cheap products from Russia and Belarus.
At that time, Nazarbayev faced a number of other economic, social, and political challenges. The national currency, the tenge, lost a fifth of its value. The ethnic Russian minority in Kazakhstan, comprising just over 20% of the population, were, meanwhile, posing challenges to his authority. And in spite of Russia having so much shared history and influence over the country, China was its number one trade partner, as well as a top source of investment.
China purchases minerals and energy from Kazakhstan, while investing in extraction and refinery projects. The Middle Kingdom not only represents a large market for Kazakhstan’s exports, but also provides the country with overland-export routes that do not involve Russia. For this reason, gas pipelines and railway extensions play a great part in investment agreements between the two countries.
It was in Astana, in 2014, that Xi Jinping first announced the Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI (then called the “New (Economic) Silk Road”). He and Nazarbayev also signed 22 commercial deals, with China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) purchasing an 8.4% stake in the Kashagan gas and oil field. Later, when Nazarbayev visited Beijing, a deal was struck, to build a terminal in the Chinese port city of Lianyungang, in order to link Eurasian railways from Kazakhstan to the Pacific Ocean. China’s Exim Bank pledged an investment of $1bn to modernize Kazakhstan’s Shymkent oil refinery. KazMunayGas and CNPC also agreed to invest a combined $150mn to build an oil and gas plant near Almaty.
Kazakhstan’s incumbent president Tokayev took office in March 2019, after Nazarbayev, who had ruled since independence, resigned. While Kazakhstan has always struggled to avoid being under Moscow’s thumb, this year’s Russian invasion of Ukraine has been a catalyst, driving Kazakhstan out of Russia’s orbit and into China’s.
‘Are we next?’
The invasion has unsettled many of the former Soviet Republics, as it begs the question “Are we next?” And even if these nations do not feel potentially threatened, many, such as Kazakhstan, are trying to build relationships with countries beyond Russia, including in the West, relationships which could become complicated by overt support for Moscow.
Kazakhstan has been careful to abide by Western sanctions, and did not recognise the self-proclaimed and Kremlin-backed independence of the two breakaway regions of Ukraine, Luhansk and Donetsk. This has driven a wedge between Astana and Moscow, as the latter expected more loyalty, given the shared history, and the fact that Russia sent troops to Kazakhstan to put down the violent unrest that shook the country in its “Bloody January”.
During a televised encounter with Putin in Russia in June, Tokayev made it plain that he did not recognise the Russian-controlled regions in eastern Ukraine and that Kazakhstan supported and abided by the integrity of internationally recognised borders. His words did not go over well with pro-war commentators in Russia, particularly the more revanchist.
In November, Tokayev agreed to increase shipments of Kazakh oil to the West, via the Caspian Sea, bypassing the Russian pipeline route to the Black Sea port of Novorossiyska that around 80% of Kazakh oil takes for shipping to world markets. For the use of that route, Kazakhstan remains dependent on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which has this year several times announced interruptions to Kazakh oil flows through its pipeline, with Russian officials each time giving suspect explanations for the restricted oil transit. Although Kazakhstan will not be able to give up the pipeline completely, Astana has announced plans for a 10-fold increase over the next few years in oil shipments going via the Caspian route. A present difficulty in accomplishing that objective is a distinct lack of available tankers plying the Caspian Sea. But the decision to expand oil flows in that direction sends a clear signal that Astana wants to achieve greater autonomy from Moscow.
Playing one off against the other
A 30-year cooperation deal, signed by Beijing and Moscow, and the declaration of a “no limits” friendship, has left Kazakhstan squeezed between its two giant neighbours. And survival, for the smaller nation, often means playing one off against the other.
There are multiple avenues for doing that. Kazakhstan and Russia are both members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). And the attendance of the Kazakh leader at the annual St Petersburg International Economic Forum is always a key moment in relations. On the other hand, Kazakhstan, like Russia, is also a member of the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which also includes India, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Iranian membership is slated to occur by April 2023.
In addition to withholding support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Tokayev has remained silent on China’s genocide against the Uyghur and other ethnic Muslims, including Kazakhs, in Xinjiang and other parts of China.
In September, when Xi Jinping made his first trip outside China since the pandemic began, he paid a state visit to Kazakhstan. On the agenda was a discussion regarding “prospects for strengthening the Kazakh-Chinese comprehensive strategic partnership.”
The complicated past with Russia and the political tensions caused by the Ukraine invasion are not the only factors causing Astana to put more distance between itself and Moscow. There is another, very pragmatic, reason for turning away from Russia and embracing China. The Russian economy is in a shambles. It now holds out less promise of the trade and investment which Kazakhstan needs. On the other hand, although Beijing is so important to Kazakhstan’s economy, many Kazakhs feel uneasy about China, fearing eventual economic colonisation.
